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FOREWORD: FROM THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY TO
JURISTOCRACY AND THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL POWER
MARK A. GRABER*
Constitutional theory in the legal academy during the late twenti-
eth century was "obsessed" by the countermajoritarian difficulty.1 Al-
exander Bickel informed law professors in 1962 that judicial review
was "a deviant institution in the American democracy."'2 "[W] hen the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action
of an elected executive," he famously asserted, "it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now."3 Passion-
ately devoted to both popular sovereignty and the Warren Court's de-
cision in Brown v. Board of Education,4 legal scholars filled the law
reviews with essays attempting to reconcile democracy and judicial re-
view. "Grand theory in constitutional law"5 became a heroic quest
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, Professor of Government,
University of Maryland, College Park. Much thanks to all the contributors and to the Mary-
land Law Review for making this Symposium possible.
1. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 334 (1998) ("The 'countermajoritarian
difficulty' has been the central obsession of modem constitutional scholarship."); Ilya
Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central
Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. Rv. 1287, 1290 (2004).
2. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962).
3. Id. at 16-17.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. This phrase was first coined by Mark Tushnet. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRIICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1 (1988).
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"for a function . . , which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the
courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do
not assume it.
'6
This legal mission did not engage the most prominent political
scientists of the late twentieth century who studied the Supreme Court
of the United States. Robert Dahl in 1957 informed students of Amer-
ican politics that judicial review rarely presented significant counter-
majoritarian problems. "[I] t would appear.., somewhat unrealistic"
he declared, "to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in
the fashion of Supreme Court justices would long hold to norms of
Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political
elite."' A second line of public law research detailed how judicial de-
cisions declaring laws unconstitutional were often ignored by local of-
ficials and did not have nearly the social impact commonly attributed
to them. Engel v. Vitale8 did little to reduce official prayer in schools,'
the due process revolution often bypassed police officers on the
beat,10 Brown v. Board of Education did not reduce segregation in the
Jim Crow South," and Roe v. Wade 2 made only a minor contribution
to expanded access to legal abortion.1" Yet another line of social sci-
ence research concluded that grand constitutional theory was politi-
cally sterile. Justices based decisions primarily on their policy
preferences, employing modes of legal discourse only instrumentally
as means to reach politically congenial results. Jeffrey Segal and Har-
old Spaeth, the leading proponents of the attitudinal model of judi-
cial behavior, declared, "Rehnquist votes the way he does because he
is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he
was extremely liberal."' 4
Committed to different and conflicting research agendas, law
professors and political scientists largely went their separate ways dur-
6. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 24.
7. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957).
8. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
9. KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS:
FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE (1971).
10. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 334-35 (1991) (discussing the
Court's extension of increased procedural rights to criminal defendants and the limited
effect it had on police conduct). But see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL
POLICY 224-37 (1977) (documenting the difficulty in determining the effect of Court deci-
sions on police conduct).
11. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 52.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 226-27.
14. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002).
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ing the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Law professors concentrated on solv-
ing a countermajoritarian problem that political scientists proclaimed
did not exist. Political scientists elaborated on behavioral models of
judicial behavior that law professors proclaimed demonstrated little
familiarity with the legal experience. Leading political science profes-
sors cited law professors only to demonstrate the latter were simple-
tons.' 5 Leading law professors did not bother citing political scientists
at all.' 6
During the mid-1990s a rapprochement began. A growing school
of historical institutionalists in public law proposed models ofjudicial
behavior that incorporated how ideas, including ideas about law and
legal institutions, influenced legal decisions. Rogers Smith insisted
that only through careful study of legal opinions could scholars iden-
tify what kind of liberal Justice Thurgood Marshall was and the debt
such conservatives as Chief Justice William Rehnquist owed to the
American liberal tradition.17 Howard Gillman insisted that Justices
understood themselves as committed to legal forms and reasoning
and that those commitments both shaped and constrained the influ-
ence of their policy preferences on judicial decisions.' Many promi-
nent law professors acknowledged that the Supreme Court was not the
sole oracle of constitutional principle. Sanford Levinson pointed to
prominent strands in the American constitutional tradition which
highlighted constitutional reasoning outside of courts.19 Barry Fried-
man suggested that constitutional decisions were typically conse-
quences of dialogues between courts and elected officials.2° Whether
judicial decisions were perceived as countermajoritarian, his magiste-
rial history of the countermajoritarian difficulty demonstrated, de-
15. See id. at 48-53 (arguing that legal scholars merely "cloak the reality of the Court's
decision-making process").
16. Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and
Neglected Relationship, 27 LAw & Soc. INQ. 309, 314-16 (2002) (book review).
17. See ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 65 (1985)
(analyzing the Court's treatment of constitutional issues and noting the ease with which
liberals and conservatives can use the same analytic paradigm to serve their distinct ends);
Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism," and the Future of Public Law,
82 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 89, 100-01 (1988) (arguing that judicial decisionmaking allows room
for judges to exercise personal choice through their opinions, although those choices are
constrained by the choices made in the past).
18. HowARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 11 (1993); Howard Gillman, The
Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of
Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MaING 65, 67-68 (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
19. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 7-8 (1988).
20. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 653-55 (1993).
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pended more on the political and intellectual climate of the times
than on pure matters of jurisprudence."
The Maryland/Georgetown Constitutional Law Schmooze,22 presently
held annually at the University of Maryland School of Law, builds on
these increasing connections between important research agendas in
the legal academy and political science. Every year, twenty or so of the
leading thinkers in academic and public law, representing older and
younger generations, descend upon Baltimore to discuss a topic of
mutual professional interest. Rather than write and present lengthy
formal papers, participants are asked to prepare a short ticket of ad-
mission that either suggests promising lines of inquiry or offers tenta-
tive hypotheses on a common subject. Conversation then goes round
the table informally. One purpose is simply to inform members of
one discipline what members of the other are thinking. Another is to
highlight different disciplinary assumptions, points of convergence,
and particular problems where insights of one discipline might in-
form research in the other.
Juristocracy provides a particularly good basis for an interdiscipli-
nary conversation. The past decades have witnessed local and global
explosions of judicial power.23 Lisa Hilbink's essay observes how "the
'judicial turn' that began in Europe in the wake of World War II has
spread to almost all corners of the globe."24 An increasing number of
countries have adopted Written constitutions, constitutional courts,
and judicial review. These new constitutional courts are intruding
into more and more areas traditionally reserved for other political
decisionmakers.2" Noga Morag-Levine's essay notes the enormous in-
fluence of such transnational institutions as the European Court of
21. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 342; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2002); Barry Fried-
man, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383, 1387 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971, 980-81 (2000); Barry Friedman,
The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five,
112YALE L.J. 153, 159-60 (2002).
22. Mark Tushnet, the founder of the Georgetown Schmooze, deserves credit for the ap-
pellation, the concept, and, most important, his exceptional support of what is presently
the Mayland/Georgetown Schmooze.
23. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURIsTOcRACY. THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING
WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OFJUDI-
CIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbj6rn Vallinder eds., 1995).
24. Lisa Hilbink, Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New Constitutionalism, 65 MD. L. REv.
15, 15 (2006).
25. HIRSCHL, supra note 23, at 169-210.
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Human Rights on "adjudicative bodies well beyond Europe."2 6  Judi-
cial review is suddenly everywhere," Gordon Silverstein concludes.
27
Americans are witnessing similar expansions of judicial power.
The Rehnquist Court, many of whose members were appointed osten-
sibly to stymie liberal activism, became the most activist court in his-
tory28 and was the first to play an official role in determining the
winner of a presidential election. 21 State courts are playing at least as
great a role fashioning local policies. Robert Williams observes how
"[i]n the last quarter of the twentieth century, American state courts
emerged as major policymakers,"3° some promoting same-sex mar-
riage and others handing down decisions requiring that "billions of
dollars" be "redirected to poor school districts as a result of school
finance litigation. '"" Even family and drug courts are playing more
substantial policy roles. Richard Boldt and Jana Singer detail how
such institutions "have largely repudiated the classical virtues of re-
straint, disinterest and modesty, replacing these features of the tradi-
tional judicial role with bold, engaged, action oriented norms."32
Scholars in law, political science, and other disciplines are con-
centrating on two dimensions of the increased empowerment of
courts throughout the world and the United States. The first set of
questions concerns the causes of juristocracy. Grand constitutional
theory treated unelected justices as seizing power from elected offi-
cials, creating the tension between democracy and judicial review that
animated the countermajoritarian difficulty. More recent scholarship
suggests that judicial review is often politically constructed, that
elected officials have numerous political and policy reasons for em-
powering constitutional courts.3" The second set of questions con-
26. Noga Morag-Levine, Judges, Legislators, and Europe's Law: Common-Law Constitutional-
ism, and Foreign Precedents, 65 MD. L. REV. 34, 34 (2006).
27. Gordon Silverstein, Sequencing the DNA of Comparative Constitutionalism: A Thought
Experiment, 65 MD. L. REv. 48, 48 (2006).
28. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY. THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004).
29. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: How THE COURT DE-
CIDED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
30. Robert F. Williams, Juristocracy in the American States?, 65 Mn. L. REV. 68, 68 (2006).
31. Id. at 72.
32. Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unifted Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV.
82, 83 (2006).
33. E.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 23, at 11; GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS 8-9
(2003); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 494 (2000); KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (forthcoming 2007);
Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in
U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-85, 97 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 483, 484 (2003); Howard Gillman, How
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cerns the consequences of juristocracy. Grand constitutional theory
treated the Supreme Court as the "forum of principle" in American
life, 4 insisting that Justices had special capacities to "listen[ ] for
voices from the margins."3 5 More recent scholarship suggests thatjus-
tices are more likely to promote elite agendas, handing down deci-
sions that favor the powerless only when doing so is consistent with
elite values and interests. 6
I. CAUSES
The essays for this Symposium articulate the emerging consensus
in law and political science that judicial review is politically con-
structed. Justices gain and increase their power to declare laws uncon-
stitutional and make public policy when and only when at least some
members of the existing governing coalition wish justices to exercise
such power. George Lovell and Scott Lemieux observe that the "inter-
action between judges and other officials cannot be understood as a
zero-sum competition in which each branch uses fixed institutional
powers. "3  Their essay asserts that the capacity of judges to exercise
power is "often dependent on contingent, politically motivated deci-
sions by elected officials in other branches of government."3" Elected
officials empower courts for the same reasons that members of gov-
erning coalitions have historically empowered such institutions as ad-
ministrative agencies. Karol Soltan's contribution recognizes that "the
recent global popularity of the delegation of decision-making author-
ity and de facto lawmaking powers to constitutional courts" cannot be
understood "in isolation from all other forms of delegation. '39 Some
elected officials hope courts will help them overcome problems associ-
ated with fragmented governing coalitions. Other government offi-
cials simply wish to foist responsibility on to the judiciary for making
Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States,
1875-1891, 96 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 511, 511 (2002); Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial
Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 425, 446 (2005) [hereinafter Graber, Constructing Judicial
Review]; Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
STUD. Am. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993) [hereinafter Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty].
34. RONALD DWORKIN, A MA-r-IER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985).
35. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1537 (1988).
36. HiRSCHL, supra note 23, at 11-12; Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, supra note 33,
at 431-38.
37. George I. Lovell & Scott E. Lemieux, Assessing Juristocracy: Are Judges Rulers or
Agents?, 65 MD. L. REv. 100, 100 (2006).
38. Id. at 101.
39. Karol Soltan, Delegation to Courts and Legitimacy, 65 MD. L. Rv. 115, 115 (2006).
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politically difficult choices.4" Silverstein notes the "powerful incen-
tives for those who fear political control is slipping from their grasp to
vest extraordinary power in courts and judges"4 1 and points out that
empowering independent courts may be "among the most effective
signals one nation can send to others that it is a reliable investment
and trading partner."42 That courts "may well bite the wrong person
from time to time," Silverstein states, will not threaten their indepen-
dence or powers as long as crucial elected officials believe they are
better off with a powerful judiciary then without.4 3
Elected officials have numerous devices for empowering courts.
Common means include creating constitutions, authorizing judicial
review, appointing justices to the bench known to be committed to
exercising the power of judicial review, and supporting litigation
aimed at having various state and federal laws declared unconstitu-
tional. Promoting constitutional adjudication has been a particularly
favored means for elected officials interested in removing issues from
congresses to courts. "[0] ne of the most common ways legislators re-
present their voters," Paul Frymer states, "is by increasing voters' abil-
ity to gain access to the courts."4 4 Lovell and Lemieux highlight how
representatives often employ "deliberate statutory ambiguity" when
seeking to empower justices to make hard policy choices.4" Courts
remain distinctive institutions, employing legal logic even as they
make political choices foisted upon them by other governing institu-
tions. Carol Nackenoff s contribution notes, the "Court has its own
norms, dynamics, and institutional history; it has doctrine, rules,
precedents, metaphors, and language peculiar to it."4 6 That justices
bring legal perspectives to public policy questions, however, hardly
places constitutional matters and questions of statutory interpretation
above the political fray. Academic lawyers and social scientists now
recognize that all governing agencies play a role "in the shaping of the
Constitution's meaning,"47 that "various institutions are deeply linked
40. See Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exer-
cise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 Am. POL. Scl. REv. 583, 584-86
(2005).
41. Silverstein, supra note 27, at 51.
42. Id. at 54.
43. Id. at 50.
44. Paul Frymer, Distinguishing Formal from Institutional Democracy, 65 MD. L. REV. 125,
128 (2006).
45. Lovell & Lemieux, supra note 37, at 104.
46. Carol Nackenoff, Is There a Political Tilt to 'Juristocracy"', 65 MD. L. REv. 139, 149
(2006).
47. Id. at 150.
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in the policymaking process. '48 Constitutional politics in a world in
which judicial power is politically constructed consists of struggles in-
side and outside of official governmental settings to empower those
political actors and institutions thought sympathetic to particular po-
litical interests and constitutional visions.
The increased powers of state and local courts are as rooted in
electoral politics as the increased power of federal courts. Williams
details various factors that "decrease the propensity of [state appellate
courts] .. .to act in a countermajoritarian fashion."4 These factors
include frequent judicial elections,5" constitutional texts that clearly
justify judicial interventions,51 and state political cultures that more
clearly require courts to engage in dialogues with elected officials and
politically active citizens in order to bring about policy and legal
change.5 2 Dialogues are facilitated by state constitutional amendment
practices that are far more majoritarian than the procedures set out in
Article V. To the extent state court decisions declaring state laws un-
constitutional can be reversed by a fairly majoritarian process, judicial
review in state courts does not present a countermajoritarian problem
in classical form.53 "Changes in judicial behavior" exhibited in local
drug and family courts, Boldt and Singer similarly note, "have less to
do with role modeling within the judicial branch and more to do with
political pressures and institutional relationships among legislatures,
courts, and administrative agencies."" The rapid growth in the num-
ber of drug courts was largely the result of "federal funding effort[s]
that pumped more than $80 million" into those institutions.55
Constitutional courts outside the United States are, if anything,
more "deeply and explicitly embedded in and contained by the demo-
cratic political process."5 6 Peter Quint's essay points out that constitu-
tional majorities in West Germany "explicit lly]" endorsed 'Judicial
review" and have authorized the Constitutional Court of Germany to
hear constitutional disputes that do not satisfy standing requirements
48. Frymer, supra note 44, at 127.
49. Williams, supra note 30, at 78 (quoting James P. Wenzel et al., Legislating from the
State Bench: A Comparative Analysis ofJudicial Activism, Am. POL. Q., July 1997, at 363, 376).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 78-79.
53. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFEcriON 237, 246-65 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (documenting the various meth-
ods states use to amend their constitutions).
54. Boldt & Singer, supra note 32, at 84.
55. Id. at 89.
56. Hilbink, supra note 24, at 17.
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in the United States.5 7 The Constitutional Court of Germany exer-
cises "moral control" over legislation, Quint explains, in part because
this function "is now thoroughly endorsed by the German population
and electorate."' 8 Many new constitutions, when sanctioning broad
judicial power, provide for greater judicial accountability. Hilbink de-
tails how European and South American nations "have established in-
stitutional mechanisms and/or informal norms to ensure that judges
who decide constitutional cases have a (much) higher level of repre-
sentative legitimacy than do ordinary judges." 9 Many nations select
justices in ways that "provide rough proportionality in partisan, relig-
ious, and geographic representation"60 and reject a life-tenured judici-
ary.6 ' Many constitutions permit electoral majorities to override
unpopular judicial decisions." That such devices are rarely employed
provides more evidence that judicial review is rarely as countermajori-
tarian as much literature suggests.63 Lovell and Lemieux note in the
American context that "[t] he availability of numerous means for chal-
lenging or reversing the effects ofjudicial rulings means that the final-
ity of judicial rulings is sometimes the result of choices made by
elected officials rather than the result of judges having any fixed
power to have the final word."64
Politically constructed judicial review presents accountability
problems, but not the accountability problems that animate the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty. The conflict between democracy and judi-
cial review is not as stark as Bickel proclaimed to the extent justices
declare laws unconstitutional or make public policy only when invited
to do so by crucial members of a governing coalition. Richard Primus
asserts that citizens are not ruled by the dead hand of the past when
popular majorities choose which strands of constitutional history shall
be central to the national narrative.65 Rather than worry about politi-
cally unaccountable justices, Lovell and Lemieux suggest constitu-
tional theorists worry about the problems of democratic governance
57. Peter E. Quint, "The Most Extraordinarily Powerful Court of Law the World Has Ever
Known"?-Judicial Review in the United States and Germany, 65 MD. L. REv. 150, 154-56
(2006).
58. Id. at 169.
59. Hilbink, supra note 24, at 22.
60. Id. at 23.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id. at 26-27.
63. See HIRSCHL, supra note 23, at 18 (noting that Canada's override clause, while not a
"dead letter," has failed to block the trend toward juristocracy).
64. Lovell & Lemieux, supra note 37, at 110.




that arise when representatives claim credit for legislation while sur-
reptitiously empowering courts to make the actual policy choice.
"When legislators shift divisive social issues to the judicial branch be-
cause they want to avoid electoral accountability for making hard
choices," they assert, "their actions raise significant concerns about
democratic accountability."66 These and other ways in which elected
officials promote judicial power suggest that the justification of judi-
cial review is likely to depend on the democratic theory being em-
ployed. Popular sovereignty, standing alone, does not provide a
sufficient basis for assessing whether democratic values are best served
by having abortion policy made by elected state officials, many of
whom have no desire to take any position on that matter,6 7 or byjus-
tices appointed and confirmed by elected national officials. "Before
abandoning court activism," Frymer reminds us, "we first need to ask
what type of democracy and representation we want. "68
II. CONSEQUENCES
The participants in the Symposium on juristocracy are more di-
vided on the consequences of increased judicial power. Hilbink is
cautiously optimistic. Justices who do not "have to cater to constitu-
ents with particular demands," she writes, "are freer to decide cases on
principle than are legislators who must keep one eye always on the
polls."6" Frymer is a similarly qualified champion of judicial power.
He observes how critics of judicial review "end up creating too much
of a dichotomy between courts and popular politics that ignores both
the inter-webs between the two and the complicated ways in which
representation is promoted within each."7° Nackenoff is more pessi-
mistic. She endorses Jack Balkin's claim that "the major beneficiaries
of the emerging conservative judicial activism appeared to be whites,
state governments, advertisers, opponents of environmental and land
use regulation, and wealthy contributors to political campaigns."71
Quint takes a more nuanced position. On the one hand, he
notes that the Constitutional Court of Germany has handed down im-
portant decisions suggesting constitutional limits on government
power to legalize abortion, take military action in concert with NATO,
66. Lovell & Lemieux, supra note 37, at 114.
67. MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION 148 (1996).
68. Frymer, supra note 44, at 129.
69. Hilbink, supra note 24, at 25.
70. Frymer, supra note 44, at 127.
71. Nackenoff, supra note 46, at 139 (quotingJack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT
Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said 3, 18 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
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and tax poor families.72 On the other hand, Quint observes that de-
spite the broad language in judicial opinions, the Constitutional
Court of Germany rarely orders elected officials to alter previous poli-
cies significantly.73 When the justices insisted on "parliamentary ap-
proval for the executive's stationing of troops abroad," he points out,
that demand was relatively painless given that "any chancellor possess-
ing the parliamentary support to remain in office would ordinarily
also have majority parliamentary support for his desired stationing of
troops."74
Several contributors claim that expanding judicial power reduces
political polarization. When political parties become dominated by
their more extremist wings, courts often become more centrist institu-
tions.7 5 The Rehnquist Court on issues as diverse as abortion, relig-
ion, and affirmative action consistently reached compromises rejected
by both the national Democratic and Republican parties." This ca-
pacity to find the political center helps explain the relative popularity
of the contemporary federal judiciary. Nackenoff points out that the
Supreme Court "appears to retain broader public confidence than is
enjoyed by other branches of the federal government" because "it re-
mains sufficiently consistent and sufficiently moderate." 7  Neal
Devins suggests "the disjunction between lawmaker complaints about
the Court and the Court's apparent irrelevance to the electorate" 8 is
the consequence of symbolic politics in a polarized polity. American
politicians must presently gain financial support from powerful ex-
tremists on the left and right who vehemently detest judicial decisions
that either limit affirmative action or legalize abortion, and appeal for
votes from centrist voters who are often aware, indifferent, or reasona-
bly approving of the relatively moderate course chartered by the
Rehnquist Court. Many legislators respond to these conflicting cam-
paign imperatives by loudly condemning 'judicial activism" whenever
courts hand down decisions that antagonize their political base,79
while quietly supporting procedural maneuvers which prevent them
72. Quint, supra note 57, at 156, 159, 161.
73. Id. at 164-65.
74. Id. at 166.
75. Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott as a Centrist Decision, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1229, 1268 (2005).
76. H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. (forthcoming 2006).
77. Nackenoff, supra note 46, at 144.
78. Neal Devins, Smoke, Not Fire, 65 MD. L. REv. 197, 197-98 (2006).
79. Id. at 201.
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from having "a chance to vote on legislation that would restrict court
power" to issue such decisions."0
Soltan suggests that the judicial moderation characteristic of the
new constitutionalism is part of broader regime "efforts to enhance
legitimacy." l Relying on Arend Lijphart's influential analysis of dem-
ocratic forms, 2 Soltan notes that the simple majoritarian model fa-
vored by proponents of legislative supremacy solves legitimacy
problems only in "small homogeneous settings."" As societies be-
come more heterogenous, political stability may be achieved only
when constitutions establish consensual practices that enable all social
groups to influence public policy. Delegation to courts is consistent
with "a moderate style of politics, committed to balancing principles
and ideals."8 4 Soltan sees "emerging ... a new form of the balanced
constitution" structured by "different legitimacy producing systems."
In this new mixed regime, government policy is legitimated partly by
the influence of the people's elected representatives, partly by the in-
fluence of particular experts in government bureaucracy, and partly
by the "distinctive procedures and forms of reasoning of a court" that
may be structured to ensure that prominent minorities have a say in
government decisionmaking 8 5
This moderation, Primus suggests, is often purchased by trun-
cating the constitutional histories available to those who wish to chal-
lenge governing majorities. His essay details how Justices both make
constitutional law and tell constitutional stories that privilege particu-
lar accounts of the national narrative. The judicial power over the
constitutional past, Primus explains, is "clio-pathic" as well as juris-
pathic s6 "When the Supreme Court articulates a view of constitu-
tional history that foregrounds some elements of that history and not
others," he writes, "there is a risk that the elements of history it ne-
glects will disappear from the view of the legal community."8 ' The
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrisonss holding that
Congress had no power under the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the
Violence Against Women Act, for example, promoted the conservative
80. Id at 202.
81. Soltan, supra note 39, at 116.
82. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY (1999).
83. Soltan, supra note 39, at 121.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 123.
86. The canonical study of the jurispathic aspects of judicial decisions is Robert M.
Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAv. L. REv. 4 (1983).
87. Primus, supra note 65, at 196.
88. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Republican interpretation of Reconstruction while rendering invisible
the more radical interpretations championed by other post-Civil War
Republicans."° The more constitutional law delegated to courts, the
less history may be available to mobilize against the legal status quo.
Primus concludes that political movements advancing alternative con-
stitutional visions must not only challenge the law as determined by
national judiciaries, but not "let courts drive their choices about what
materials should be added to our collective constitutional memory."° °
The expansion of judicial power within nations has generated an
expansion of judicial conversations between nations. Morag-Levine
notes "a marked increase in the prevalence of citation to foreign court
opinions on the part of a growing number of national supreme courts
and international adjudicative bodies."91 The vigorous American de-
bate over this practice92 is anomalous. Only in the United States has
significant opposition emerged to the judicial practice of citing for-
eign sources. 3 Moreover, while American justices historically sought
to prevent American legislatures from importing civil law reforms,
"the roles have reversed with some judges serving as agents of trans-
plantation and some legislators guarding the gates."9 4 At the heart of
this debate, Morag-Levine declares, are issues concerning whether the
Constitution of the United States is so distinctive that, while citations
from any state or lower federal court at any time in history might in-
form present constitutional policy, citations from any foreign source
do not. "To the extent that the protection of American exceptional-
ism is understood to be part of the original American constitutional
project," Morag-Levine notes without approving, "all manner of legal
borrowing from Europe becomes constitutionally suspect." 5
Whatever the merits of borrowing for interpreting constitutional
texts, this Symposium highlights the merits of borrowing for explain-
ing constitutional development. Models developed to explain the in-
creasing empowerment of American courts9 6 are being successfully
89. Primus, supra note 65, at 188-89. See generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING
RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH
(1999).
90. Primus, supra note 65, at 192.
91. Morag-Levine, supra note 26, at 32.
92. See Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the
Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 345 (2005), and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003) for a sample of this ongoing
debate.
93. Morag-Levine, supra note 26, at 33.
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 43.
96. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 33, at 70-73.
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exported abroad to explain the increasing empowerment of foreign
courts97 and that foreign experience has successfully been imported
to explain American practice. 8 Judicial practice in the United States
and abroad, while typically advertised as a means for protecting the
less fortunate, has quite frequently benefited the upper-middle class.
Students of courts across the world are recognizing thatjustices are far
more supportive of elite gender roles than the rights of labor un-
ions.99 At the very least, gone are the days when Americans blithely
asserted that judicial review was necessary to protect fundamental
freedoms, oblivious to the actual role the judiciary has played in the
United States and the complex ways in which fundamental freedoms
have and have not been protected in other countries. Perhaps the
United States is different, but discovering the relevant differences re-
quires far more comparative study than engaged in by the scholars
who obsessed over the countermajoritarian difficulty.
97. HIRSCHL, supra note 23, at 39-40.
98. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, supra note 33, at 432.
99. See id. at 438; Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Constitutionalism, Judicial Re-
view, and Progressive Change, 84 TEX. L. REv. 433 (2005) (book review).
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